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STATEMENT OF

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4)• This case was
assigned from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals
on August 1, 1995.

1

DETERMINATIVE

AUTHORITY

In addition to the relevant case law cited hereinafter, the
Defendants and Appellees in the above-entitled case believe the
following authority to be determinative of this dispute on appeal:
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32
Utah Code Annotated §68-3-2 (1953)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and in setting aside a judgment, order or
proceeding based upon excusable neglect, after taking into
consideration all of the facts in a case. The trial court's
determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).

Furthermore, a trial

court has broad discretion to set aside a stipulation on a
procedural matter. United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 445
P.2d 766 (Utah 1968).

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether counsel for the Defendants and Appellees

could bind the same with respect to the September 21, 1994
stipulation, when the stipulation involved a settlement of the
entire case and did not involve merely a procedural matter, and
when the trial court later found excusable neglect on the part of
the Defendants and Appellees with respect to said stipulation.

2.

Whether Judge Rigtrup of the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, acted
within his discretion in ruling in accordance with Rule 60, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in enforcing the material terms to
the stipulation of September 21, 1994.

3.

Whether the Plaintiff and Appellant is barred from

raising certain issues on appeal which were not raised at the
trial court level. In particular, whether the Plaintiff and
Appellant is barred from raising the issue of the propriety of
Judge Hyde's referral of this case back to Judge Rigtrup, when
this issue was neither raised below, nor did the Plaintiff and
Appellant object to the substance of Judge Hyde's ruling below.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The relevant procedural facts in this case are as follows.
The parties to this action entered into a stipulation in open
court on September 21, 1994 in an effort to resolve the underlying
contractual dispute herein [R 601, R 602, R 614]. Due to the
illness of Judge Moffat, the Judge originally assigned to this
case, Judge Rigtrup presided over the entry of this stipulation
onto the Court record [R 614].

Time was not made of the essence

for purposes of said stipulation, but instead an arbitrary and
tentative deadline of October 3, 1994, was selected [R 601, R 602,
R 614].

The corporate Defendant was not able to receive approval

of the board of directors of the settlement agreement amount of
$7,500.00 by the arbitrary deadline date, and the Plaintiff and
Appellant moved to reinstate a Summary Judgment which had been
previously vacated by stipulation of the parties [R 586, R 605, R
628, R 657].
Due to the continued illness of Judge Moffat, Judge Hyde was
assigned to hear the matter, and he ruled without oral argument,
on November 18, 1994, to reinstate the Summary Judgment in the
amount of $38,842.74 [R 667]. The Defendants and Appellees
submitted a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Summary
Judgment, based upon excusable neglect [R 708].
4

Judge Hyde, on

February 8, 1995 [R 786] vacated his prior order reinstating the
Summary Judgment, and ordered that Judge Rigtrup, who had been
presiding during the time that the in-court stipulation was
entered into on September 21, 1994, was the proper Judge to hear
the issues incident to the Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion, and the
Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of the Summary Judgment [R
786],
On February 27, 1995, Judge Rigtrup ruled that the Summary
Judgment was not to be reinstated, but instead that the material
terms to the stipulation of September 21, 1994, were to be
enforced [R 828, R 832].
Peuler [R 856].

The case was then assigned to Judge

The Plaintiff and Appellant filed its notice of

appeal on March 17, 1995 [R 845] and its Amended Notice of Appeal
on April 3, 1995 [R 850].

The procedural history of this case is

outlined in greater detail within the Defendants' and Appellees'
Statement of Facts, set forth hereinafter.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about September 21, 1994, before the

Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, the attorneys for the parties in
this case entered into a voluntary stipulation and settlement
agreement, purportedly resolving the dispute between the parties
[see copy of transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "A", on page 2
5

at line 15; R 601, R 602, R 614].

2.

Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation, and in

accordance with the understanding of the Defendants' counsel at
that time, the Defendants were to pay $7,500.00 [ R 601, R 602, R
614].

The stipulation and order were first to have been prepared

by Mr. Rust, counsel for the Plaintiff, and the Defendants were
first to have had the opportunity to sign the stipulation and
approve the order as to form, pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration [see Exhibit "A" and see Affidavits
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; R 601, R 602, R 614].

3.

The settlement deadline date was tentatively

scheduled for approximately ten (10) days after September 21,
1994, or October 4, 1994, contingent

upon the appropriate approval

of the corporate Defendant and the signing of an order by this
Court [see Exhibit MB"; R 614, R 628, R 657].

4.

Mr. Rust, counsel for the Plaintiff, assented to

this arrangement by stating, "I think we have an agreement here"
[see Exhibit "A"f on page 2 at line 19; R 615].

5.

Counsel for the Defendants, Mr. Zoll, communicated
6

with Defendant Floyd Weston over the telephone regarding this
conditional stipulation and Mr. Westonf who was not clearly
understood by Mr. Zoll, stated that prior to entering into the
settlement agreement he would need to get the approval of the
Board of Directors of the corporate Defendant [see Exhibit "B"; R
623, R 628, R 657].

6.

Mr. Zoll described the material terms to the

agreement to Mr. Weston at that time [see Exhibit "B"].

However,

Weston misunderstood Zoll relative to the conditional October 3,
1994 deadline, and believed that the stipulation would not be
binding until an order had been signed by the Judge, pursuant to
his prior experience in such matters, until he had received a copy
of the proposed order and until the approval of the Board of
Directors of the corporate Defendant, in entering into the
agreement, had been received [see Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R
657].

7.

The conditional agreement was never reduced to a

written stipulation, and an order embodying said agreement was
never signed by the Court, in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 4-504(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

7

8.

Inasmuch as the members of the Board of Directors

of the corporate Defendant were out of town at all relevant times,
Floyd Weston was unable to get their approval for the settlement
agreement. As a resultf the $7f500.00 amount was not paid to the
Plaintiff by October 3, 1994 [see Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R
657].

9.

Mr. Weston personally contacted the agents for the

Plaintiff on October 4, 1994, and informed them that the Board had
not yet approved the agreement, but that the Defendants were
otherwise still readyf willing and able to pay the settlement
amount. The Plaintiff, by and through its agents, refused to
accept the amount, claiming that the arbitrary and conditional
deadline of October 3, 1994 had not been met by the Defendants
[see Exhibit "B"; R 623f R 628, R 657].

10.

In addition, on October 4, 1994, Mr. Zoll had a

telephone conversation with Mr. Rust, wherein Zoll explained that
the Defendant Formula Technology, Inc., required approval of its
Board of Directors. Mr. Zoll further explained to Rust that
Weston had misunderstood the outcome of the settlement conference,
and was unaware of the October 3, 1994 deadline [see Exhibit "B";
R 623, R 628, R 657].
8

11.

During the course of that conversation, no mention

was made relative to a reinstatement of the Summary Judgment, or
to any other form of default proceedings. Mr. Zoll then stated
that the Defendants would still pay the $7,500.00 to settle the
matter by October 10, 1994. However, Mr. Rust refused to accept
the arrangement [See Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R 657].

12.

Time was not made of the essence in the terms of

the stipulation, but the October 3, 1994 deadline was tentatively
designated as the end of the ten (10) day period after the
settlement agreement was allegedly entered into [see Exhibit "A";
R 614].

Inasmuch as October 1, 1994 was a Saturday, counsel and

the Court designated October 3, 1994 as the conditional deadline
date. Therefore, that date had no independent significance as a
deadline for the payment of the $7,500.00 settlement amount [See
Exhibit "A"; R 614].

13.

The Plaintiff now unilaterally seeks to reinstate a

Summary Judgment against the Defendants, in the amount of
$38,842.74, which was previously vacated, pursuant to a voluntary
Stipulation between counsel on August 5, 1994 [R 586].
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14.

On or about November 4, 1994, the Third Judicial

District Court was scheduled to hear the Plaintiff's Motion to
Reinstate the Summary Judgment, which hearing was continued until
November 18, 1994, due to the fact that the Judge assigned to hear
this matter did not yet have the Court's file [R 666].

15.

However, on November 18, 1994, this Court, the

Honorable Judge Hyde presiding, made a ruling, granting the
Plaintiff's Motion without ever affording the Defendants the
opportunity for a hearing on the dispositive Motion, in spite of
the Defendants' timely request for oral argument, made in
accordance with Rule 4-501(3)(b), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration [R 667].

16.

The Defendants then filed a Motion for Relief from

the Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure [R 704].

17.

On or about February 2, 1995, Judge Hyde ruled to

vacate his ruling of November 18, 1994, and ruled that Judge
Rigtrup would be the proper judge to review the Defendants' 60(b)
Motion, and to rule with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for
Reinstatement of Summary Judgment, due to the fact that Rigtrup
10

was the presiding Judge at the time of the September 21, 1994
stipulation [see transcript of hearing before Judge Hyde, attached
hereto as Exhibit "C"; R 775, R 865 - R 904].

In addition, on or

about February 8, 1995, Judge Hyde signed an Order vacating the
Summary Judgment, in order that Judge Rigtrup could make a
decision relative to these matters [R 786].

18.

On or about February 27, 1995, this matter came

before Judge Rigtrup for oral argument [see transcript of hearing
before Judge Rigtrup, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"; R 828]. The
Court, after having the opportunity to review the procedural
history of the case and the underlying merits of the respective
parties' claims, ruled to enforce the material terms to the
stipulation entered into on September 21, 1994, and the Plaintiff
subsequently appealed [R 828, R 845, R 850].

SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT

The Plaintiff and Appellant has claimed that counsel for the
Defendants and Appellees, B Ray Zoll, Esq., irreversibly bound his
clients when he entered into the stipulation at issue, on the
record, on September 21, 1994. The Plaintiff and Appellant thus
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
enforce said stipulation, the terms for which included the October
11

3, 1994 arbitrary deadline date, and in failing to reinstate the
Summary Judgment. However, Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32, and the
relevant case law interpreting this statute, provides that while
an attorney binds his client with respect to procedural matters,
the power to settle a lawsuit clearly resides in the client.
The Defendants and Appellees were not present in the court
room at the time the stipulation was entered into by their
attorney, and there was clearly a mistake of fact and an
inadvertence with respect to receiving approval of the board of
directors of the corporate Defendant for purposes of paying the
settlement amount determined by the September 21, 1994
stipulation. The trial court properly found excusable neglect on
the part of the Defendants and Appellees in this regard, as argued
more fully hereinafter. Therefore, in the interests of justice
and due to this inadvertence on the part of the Defendants and
Appellees, the trial court Judge properly refused to enforce in
its entirety the stipulation of September 21, 1994. This decision
was squarely within the broad discretion of the trial court to set
aside settlement stipulations, under such circumstances.
In addition, the Plaintiff and Appellant, at this point in
the proceedings, takes issue with Judge Hyde's referral of the
case back to Judge Rigtrup for purposes of a determination with
respect to the Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
12

Judgment, and with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate
Summary Judgment, as a violation of the "law of the case"
doctrine. However, it has been clearly held by the Utah appellate
courts that a decision may be set aside in order to correct a
mistake, and this does not amount to a violation of said doctrine.
In any event, the Plaintiff failed entirely to make objection
before the Third Judicial District Court with respect to Judge
Hyde's Order referring the matter back to Judge Rigtrup, beyond a
mere objection to the form of said Order. Therefore, this issue
was not raised before the trial court and cannot properly be
raised for the first time on appeal.
The Third Judicial District Court has acted at all relevant
times within its broad discretion in this case, and the rulings
made and relevant orders entered thereby, which the Plaintiff and
Appellant has appealed, should properly be affirmed by the Utah
Court of Appeals. Although this case has a complicated procedural
history, involving several different judges, this is not the fault
of the Defendants and Appellees, or of the Third Judicial District
Court, and this factor has not impacted the propriety of the
Court's ultimate decisions in this case, pursuant to the Court's
broad discretion.

13

ARGUMENT
I.

LIMITATIONS UPON AN ATTORNEY'S ABILITY TO BIND A CLIENT
The Plaintiff and Appellee has argued within its Appellate

Brief that general principles of contract law are applicable in
this case, in conjunction with an agent's ability to bind its
principal. The Plaintiff and Appellee claims that B. Ray Zoll, as
attorney of record for the Defendants and Appellees, acted as an
ordinary agent, and bound the Defendants and Appellees in the same
way, and to the same degree with respect to the settlement
stipulation of September 21, 1994. However, Utah Code Annotated
§78-51-32 (1953) more specifically delineates and describes the
limitations to the attorney-client relationship, as follows:
78-51-32.
Authority of attorneys and counselors.
An attorney and counselor has authority:
(1)

to execute in the name of his client a bond or other
written instrument necessary and proper for the
prosecution of an action or proceeding about to be
or already commenced, or for the prosection or
defense of any right growing out of an action,
proceeding or final judgment rendered therein.

(2)

to bind his client in any of the steps of an action
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk
or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not
otherwise.

(3)

to receive money claimed by his client in an action
or proceeding during the pendency thereof or after
judgment, unless a revocation of his authority is
filed, and, upon payment thereof and not otherwise,
14

to discharge the claim or acknowledge satisfaction
of the judgment.
Subsections (2) and (3) of the above statute were discussed and
interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of John Deere
Co. v. A&H Equipment, 876 P.2d 880 (Ut. App. 1994), citing State
v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
It was held in John Deere Co., that in Musselman, the only
other Utah case to cite this statute at that timef the Court
"noted the long-established rule that attorneys can make
procedural decisions in a lawsuit but it is the client's right to
make decisions regarding settlement." The Utah Court of Appeals
in John Deere Co. further held that:
We believe, however, that the thrust of §78-51-32(2) is
to give attorneys the power to act on their client's behalf,
in most cases without prior consultation, as to those
procedural matters of a lawsuit for which attorneys have
the expertise and obligation to act in the best interests of
their clients. Section 78-51-32(2) protects an attorney from
disciplinary action for so acting. . . Clearly, the power
to settle a lawsuit resides in the client [emphasis
added].
Therefore, although in general terms an attorney acts as an agent
for his client, the above statute describes, defines and limits
that particular agency relationship, to be distinguished from a
customary principal-agent relationship pursuant to the common law
of agency.

15

Utah Code Annotated §68-3-2 (1953) provides in relevant part
that when a statute of the State of Utah and the general common
law come in conflict,
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application
to the statutes of this state . . . The statutes establish
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they
relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Pursuant to the language of the above statute, it is clear that
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32 takes precedence over the general
common law with respect to the nature and limitations of an
attorney's agency relationship with his or her client.
Accordingly, the Defendants and Appellees were not irreversibly
bound by the acts of B. Ray Zoll, Esq., for purposes of the
settlement stipulation of September 21, 1994.
Therefore, Judge Rigtrup did not abuse his discretion in
ruling that the Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the
October 3, 1994 arbitrary deadline of the September 21, 1994
stipulation. The stipulation was not reduced to writing pursuant
to the requirements of Rule 4-504(3), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, and there was a miscommunication between counsel
and the Defendant Floyd Weston, which the Court found to amount to
excusable neglect on the part of the Defendants and Appellees.
16

Due to this inadvertence, and based upon Utah Code Annotated §7851-32, regarding the limitations of an attorney's ability to bind
his or her client, Judge Rigtrup properly refused to enforce in
its entirety the stipulation of September 21, 1994.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN
SETTING ASIDE THE REINSTATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND IN
ENFORCING THE MATERIAL TERMS OF THE STIPULATION
In the case of United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 445

P.2d 766 (Utah 1968), it was held that it is within the discretion
of the trial court to determine whether settlement stipulations
should be vacated orf alternatively, whether they should be
enforced.

In addition, the case of First of Denver Mortgage

Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979),
it was held by the Utah Supreme Court that parties are bound by
their stipulations unless upon motion they are relieved therefrom
by the court, "which may, in the interest of justice and fair
play, set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable
cause [emphasis added].

Also see Robbins v. Cook, 734 P.2d 415

(Utah 1986) [The court has broad discretion to set aside a
stipulation on a procedural matter. Upon timely motion, the court
may set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable cause
when it is in the interest of justice to do so].
Such is clearly the case heref and Judge Rigtrup's ruling was
17

well within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the
furtherance of justice. Judge Rigtrup found that there was
inadvertence and excusable neglect on the part of Defendant Floyd
Weston [R 828, R 830] with respect to the October 3, 1994 deadline
and thus, pursuant to the case law cited above, held that the
Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the deadline date of
the September 21, 1994 stipulation.
The Appellant is attempting to turn a $7,500.00 settlement
amount into a $38,842.74 judgment, without providing the Appellees
the opportunity to present their case on the merits at trial, at
which trial the Appellees have felt confident all along that they
would prevail. The Appellant has conceded that this case has a
confused procedural history. The clarification and resolution of
this dispute has been months in coming, due to the fluctuations in
judges to whom the case has been assigned, through no fault of any
of the parties to this action. Furthermore, the Appellant has not
disputed the lower court's finding of excusable neglect on the
part of the Appellee Floyd Weston [R 828, R 830].

This is true in

spite of the Appellant's erroneous implication that this neglect
was in fact due to the actions of the Appellees' counsel, who it
has been alleged irreversibly bound the Defendants and Appellees.
As set forth within the Affidavit of Floyd Weston [see Exhibit
"B"; R 628], the board of directors of the corporate appellee were
18

out of town and otherwise unavailable to approve the settlement
agreement, which fact was not known to Weston at the time of the
September 21, 1994 stipulation, and which fact was not properly
communicated between the Appellees and their counsel [see Exhibit
"B"; R 628].
Although the actions of an attorney will under ordinary
circumstances serve to bind his or her client with respect to
procedural matters, as set forth above, a trial court has broad
discretion with respect to stipulations and pursuant to Rule
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside a judgment,
order or proceeding based upon excusable neglect, after taking
into consideration all of the factors in a case. Birch v. Birch,
111 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) [The trial court is afforded
broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment
under Subdivision (b), and its determination will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion]. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52
(Utah 1984) [The trial court has discretion in determining whether
a movant has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect," and the Supreme Court will reverse the trial court's
ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion].
The Plaintiff and Appellant has not once, throughout these
proceedings, provided evidence or even asserted that time was of
the essence when the settlement agreement of September 21, 1994
19

was verbally entered into before Judge Rigtrup, and has never even
claimed that this deadline date was a material term to the
stipulation. The Appellant furthermore has not provided any
claims or evidence of prejudice suffered due to the passing of
this arbitrary October 3, 1994 deadline. This is especially true,
in light of the fact that the Appellees tendered the payment
amount only a few days after this "deadline," which payment was
inexplicably refused by the Appellant. The Appellant is merely
seeking a windfall based upon a technicality, and has at this
point determined that it is no longer satisfied with the
settlement amount of $7,500.00 which it previously and voluntarily
agreed to in open court.
But for the unavoidable inadvertence, the resulting excusable
neglect of the Appellees, and the confounded judicial proceedings
of the case, the settlement amount would have been paid by the
arbitrarily chosen deadline date, and this entire case would have
been resolved in October of 1994. Besides the fact that the
Appellees claim the terms to the stipulation were ambiguous, said
stipulation was entered into based upon an inadvertence and
mistake of fact as set forth above, and there were outside factors
giving rise to the Appellees' excusable neglect in this regard.
Judge Rigtrup took all of these factors into account, and
given the confused procedural history of this case, the Court
20

merely added the appropriate amount of accrued interest, costs,
and $1,500.00 in attorney's fees to the original settlement amount
of $7,500.00. This decision amounted to a fair and logical
resolution of this matter. The lower Court had the broad
discretion to rule as it did, and the Appellant has provided
neither evidence of an abuse of this discretion, nor any
compelling reasons why this determination should be disturbed on
appeal, merely adding to the fees and costs to the parties.

III. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE BELOW THE ISSUE OF THE
PROPRIETY OF JUDGE HYDE'S RULING OF FEBRUARY 2, 1995,
AND HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO DO SO ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff and Appellant has argued, within its Appellate
Brief, that Judge Hyde improperly referred this case back to Judge
Rigtrup for a determination on the Defendants' and Appellees'
Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and on the Plaintiff's and Appellant's
Motion to Reinstate Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff and Appellant
further claims that the ruling of Judge Hyde of December 2, 1994
[R 675], reinstating the Summary Judgment, became "the law of the
case", after which time the Defendants and Appellees filed their
Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from this Judgment. However, Rule
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a clear and obvious
means for vacating judgments, and the filing of a motion pursuant
21

to this Rule does not amount to a violation of the "law of the
case doctrine."
In any event, it has been held that "the law of the case
doctrine does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and
fixing it," Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).

It was

further held in Gillmor that:
Among situations where reconsideration ot a previously
decided issue is recognized as desirable, notwithstanding
the law of the case, is when there is a "need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." [citing
Federal Practice, §4478, at 790; emphasis added].
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals held in McKee v. Williams, 741
P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), that the trial court can
change a ruling until a final decision is formally rendered, and
that the trial court judge in McKee did not abuse his discretion
by rescinding his prior decision.
In any event, however, the issue regarding the propriety of
the referral of this case from Judge Hyde back to Judge Rigtrup
was not raised before the trial court, and the issue has thus been
waived by the Plaintiff and Appellant for purposes of this appeal.
It was held in State v. Smith, 866 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1993) that,
"It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not address
issues raised for the first time on appeal except in extraordinary
circumstances . . " [emphasis added], citing Onq International,
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Also see State
22

v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) and State v. Steqqall, 660 P.2d
252 (Utah 1983).
Following Judge Hyde's ruling of February 2, 1995, vacating
the Reinstatement of Summary Judgment and referring the matter
back to Judge Rigtrup, the Plaintiff and Appellant objected only
to the form of the proposed Order submitted by the Defendants and
Appellees, and signed by Judge Hyde on February 8, 1995 [R 789].
There was never any objection below whatsoever with respect to
Judge Hyde's involvement in this case, or with respect to the
propriety of Judge Hyde's decision to refer the case back to Judge
Rigtrup, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial
Administration. This issue has only been raised by the Plaintiff
and Appellant for the first time on appeal, and thus it has not
been preserved for said purposes. In accordance with the
applicable case law, this argument has been waived by the
Plaintiff and Appellant and should not be afforded any weight
whatsoever at this stage of the proceedings.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff and Appellant has attempted, by taking
advantage of the fact that the Defendants did not pay the
settlement amount on the arbitrary and conditional deadline date,
to avert the merits of this case, and to do everything possible to
23

avoid going to trial. This is due to the fact that the
Plaintiff's substantive claims in this case have been
nonmeritorious. Manifest injustice would result in this case if
the Defendants are burdened with a $38,842.74 Summary Judgment,
when that judgment was previously voluntarily vacated by a
Stipulation between the parties. This is especially truef

I
inasmuch as the Plaintiff has already agreed to accept $7,500.00
as a full settlement of all claims to resolve this dispute.
Judge Rigtrup clearly took this position in ruling in favor of the
Defendants, and enforcing the material terms to the September 21,
1994 in-court stipulation. The Judge properly ruled that
Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the arbitrary deadline
date of October 4, 1993, due to inadvertence, and consistent with
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32.
Judge Rigtrup had the full opportunity to review all of the
background facts and judicial proceedings which comprise this
case. The Judge properly ruled that the material terms to the
previous settlement agreement between the parties of September 21,
1994 should remain in force, despite the elapsing of the initial
arbitrary deadline date for making said payment. The Judge ruled
that there had been excusable neglect on the part of the
Appellees, in light of the mistake of fact thereby, and the
convoluted procedural history of this case. The trial court Judge
24

had broad discretion, in the interests of justice and fair play,
to make such a determination, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in accordance with the applicable Utah case law.
DATED this .T^ day of August, 1995.

By RAY ZOLIy
Sttorneyf tod Defendants/Appellees

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this Q4^ day of
August, 1995, to the following:
JOSEPH C. RUST
IAN A FORREST
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
*

3

*

*

41 GULL LABORATORIES,
Plaintiff,
5

6

1

7

-vs-

Case No. 930900564

WESTON,

81
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STIPULATION, 9-21-94
Defendant.

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st,

12

1994, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came on for

13

hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP,

14

District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake

15

County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S :

18

For the Plaintiff:

JOSEPH RUST
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

RAY ZOLL
Attorney at Law
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20
21
22
23

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

24
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

Laboratories versus Floyd E. Weston; File 930900564.

4
5

May we have your appearances for the
record, please?

6
7

MR. RUST:

Joseph Rust on behalf of the

MR. ZOLL:

Ray Zoll representing the

Plaintiff.

8
9

This is in the matter of Gull

Defendants, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

And it's my understanding

11

that the Defendant will pay Plaintiff $7,500 within

12

ten days or suffer default judgment to enter as

13

previously entered?

14

MR. ZOLL:

That is correct, your Honor.

15

Can we say ten days from the stipulation

16

being signed by the Judge, the stipulation and order,

17

which Mr. Rust would prepare the papers and we'd

18

approve it as to form?

19
20
21
22

MR. RUST:

I think we have an agreement

here.
THE COURT:

On or about 5:00 p.m.,

September -- October 1.

23

MR. ZOLL:

That's agreeable, your Honor.

24

MR. RUST:

Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Is that agreeable?

1
2

MR. R U S T :

October

1 is a Saturday,

Honor.

3

THE C O U R T :

4

MR. ZOLL:

That will be

5

MR. R U S T :

That will be the

3rd.

6

MR. ZOLL:

That will be the

3rd.

7

October

8

THE C O U R T :

9

MR. ZOLL:

10

5:00 p.m.

3rd by 5:00

on Monday?
agreeable.

o'clock

—

and d i s m i s s a l

--

$7,500.
—

THE C O U R T :

In the event there is a

11

default, then M r . Rust can submit an affidavit

12

it wasn't paid; judgment may then enter as

13

entered by Judge M o f f a t .

14
15

MR. ZOLL:
dismissal

Yes.

And M r . Rust prepare

papers?
THE C O U R T :

17

Each party to pay their own fees

Okay.

20

MR. ZOLL:

22
23
24
25

Yes.
and

costs.

19

21

that

previously

16

18

your

Thank y o u , J u d g e .
(Hearing

adjourned.)

the

1

REPORTER'S

CERTIFICATE

2
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

County of SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss •

5
6

I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify

7

that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary

8

Public in and for the State of Utah;

9

That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at

10

the time and place therein named and thereafter

11

reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided

12

transcription

13
14
15

16

(CAT) under my direction and control;

I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 7th day of

October, 1994.

17
18
19

(Signature)
CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR.
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21
22
23
24
25

-• - « j

5J.PCT[!, P;? 3: 35
B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
ZOLL & BRANCH
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 262-1500
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GULL LABORATORIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF
FLOYD WESTON

vs.
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,

Civil No. 930900564 CV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, FLOYD WESTON, being first duly sworn under oath
depose and say:

•• •') • ) * > 1

v

1.

I am of adult years and competent to make this

Affidavit for said purposes. All the statements hereinafter set
forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my
personal and direct, knowledge of the matters to which said
statements pertain. If called as a witness by a court of
competent jurisdiction, I am able to and shall testify as to each
and all of said matters in the manner heretofore set forth in this
Affidavit.

2.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident

of the State of Utah over the age of 18 years.

3.

I am an individual Defendant in the above-entitled

matter, and I am the President of the corporate Defendants
involved herein.

4.

The Court in this case requested that the parties

discuss settlement. My counsel called me and described the
settlement negotiations. Although I was involved in the
settlement agreement of September 21, 1994, I misunderstood my
counsel over the telephone, relative to the October 4, 1994
deadline.

2

•1fl0 6 ;: «

5.

I anticipated that a written order would be

prepared, providing me with a chance to review it and make sure
that it was acceptable, as per prior experience I have had with
the local rules of this Court.

6.

In any event, I first was required to obtain the

approval of the Board of Directors of the corporate Defendants,
before this amount could be disbursed in accordance with the
standard operating procedures thereof, and this approval had not
yet been received at the time of the unknown deadline.

7.

I personally informed agents for the Plaintiff over

the telephone that this was the status of the settlement
agreement, and that I was awaiting Board approval. I further
informed agents for the Plaintiff that the Defendants were still
willing to pay the $7,500.00 amount, but agents for the Plaintiff
refused to accept said amount.

8.

Therefore, in the event that this settlement

agreement and the $7,500.00 amount is no longer acceptable to the
Court, I have instructed my counsel to request that a trial date
be scheduled in order that this matter may be heard, and so that I
may have my day in court.
3

00

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT:
DATED this 'Q "day of getpber, 1994.

On this /3' day of October, 1994, personally appeared before
me FLOYD WESTON, known to me as the person named in and who
executed this Affidavit and acknowledged that said Affidavit was
read and was understood by said person and was executed as the
free act and deed of said person.

IMJLC*

NOTARY^ PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing At:,

vAivvcL^mvLV^
NOTARY PU2LIC
STATE CF UTAH
K'.y Comrr*ss>cn Expires
Mf5:i3So«m2£0V.'sa*:6l)
S? I L^3 C tv. U -1 8*123

4

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this \S

day of

October, 1994, to the following:
Joseph C. Rust
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff

5
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
ZOLL & BRANCH
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 262-1500
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GULL LABORATORIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

REPLY AFFIDAVIT
OF B. RAI ZOLL

vs.
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,

Civil No. 930900564 CV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, B. RAY ZOLL, being first duly sworn under oath depose
and say:

1

1.

I am of adult years and competent to make this

Affidavit for said purposes. All the statements hereinafter set
forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my
personal and direct knowledge of the matters to which said
statements pertain. If called as a witness by a court of
competent jurisdiction, I am able to and shall testify as to each
and all of said matters in the manner heretofore set forth in this
Affidavit.

2.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah over the age of 18 years.

3.

I am the attorney of record for the Defendants in

the above-entitled matter and therefore I have direct involvement
and personal knowledge pertaining to the facts leading up to, and
subsequent to, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of Summary
Judgment.

4.

Joseph C. Rust, in his Affidavit dated October 17,

1994, stated that, during the course of a telephone conversation
which he had with me on October 4, 1994:
Mr. Zoll informed affiant that although defendants had not
paid the money by October 3, 1994, that they were still
desirous to do so but would not be able to make the payment
2

o f. u a T ^

of $7,500.00 until the following Monday, October 10.
However, this is a mischaracterization of what I actually said
during that conversation.

5.

I explained to Mr. Rust, during that October 4,

1994 telephone conference, that Defendant Floyd Weston would need
to receive the approval of the board of directors of the corporate
Defendant, Formula Technlogy. I also explained at that time that
my client, Defendant Floyd Weston, had misunderstood the outcome
of the settlement conference, and was unaware of the October 4,
1994 deadline for payment of the settlement amount.

6.

Furthermore, no mention was made at that time

relative to a reinstatement of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, or to any other form of default proceedings. I then
stated that we would still pay the $7,500.00 to settle the matter
by Monday, October 10, 1994, or go to trial. Mr. Rust refused to
accept the arrangements, but stated that our client had to call
his client.

7.

Mr. Rust has been apprised throughout of the

situation and of the reasons for nonpayment of the settlement
amount by the Defendants.
3
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT:
DATED this

On this

£

day of November

4~ day of November/ 1994, personally appeared

before me B. RAY ZOLL, known to me as the person named in and who
executed this Affidavit and acknowledged that said Affidavit was
read and was understood by said person and was executed as the
free_act and_deed of said person.
> ZZ'O 3CL2h ~CQ W--t /ZCO
"\
Ja.t Laka C.:y. *JT 64 « 23
My Ccrrmssicn Sxprat
Januarys, "S93
STATS C r UTAH

My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s ;

*' *WfyG' z~
NOTARY^UBLIC
Residing At:

S.L.C

f> A

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct/copy of the

~> ft?fday of

foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this JD
November, 1994, to the following:
Joseph C. Rust
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintif-f^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

GULL LABORATORIES, INC.
a Utah corporation,

4

Civil No. 930500564CV
Plaintiff,

5
HEARING ON MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

vs.
6
7
8

FLOYD E. WESTON dba
METABOLIC RESEARCH
INSTITUTE and FORMULA
TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada
corporation,

(Videotape Proceedings)

9
Defendants.
10
-oOo11
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of January,
12
1995, commencing at the hour of 4:07 p.m., the above13
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE
14
RONALD 0. HYDE, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court
15
for the purpose of this cause, and that the following
1G
videotape proceedings were had.
17
A P P E A R A N C E S
IS
For the Plaintiff

JOSEPH C. RUST
Attorney at Law
Kesler & Rust
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendants

B. RAY ZOLL
Attorney at Law
Zoll & Branch
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah

19
20
21
22
23
24

84123

25

ALAN P SMITH. CSrl
3*5 9BAHMA 0RIVE IM1) 2S&CO20
SACT UkKE CITY UTAH 94107

cvA;A;X^«?f

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. ZOLL:

6

Where do we stand this time?
Good morning, your Honor.

I'm—afternoon, I mean; it's been a long day for me.

7

We stand—this is a motion for setting aside under

8

Rule 60(b) the judgment that we—we initially had talked

9

about we thought we would get Judge Rigtrup, your Honor, we

10

know we had that issue, you didn't really say that would be

11

an order.

12

Judge Rigtrup was the one that was involved with

13

the stipulation, there's a lot of ques—a lot of things I

14

plan to raise today about that stipulation.

15

THE COURT:

16

Judge Rigtrup about doing this?

17

you were going to do that.

18

MR. ZOLL:

Have you ever talked to
The last time we left here,

I understand, through his

19

clerk, I've not talked to him, that she needs some kind of a

20

motion or something and we didn't know exactly what to file,

21

other than the motion that's pending.

22

I believe that Judge Rigtrup would not have a

23

problem, if I can get through his clerk, and figure out how

24

to get something before him; because the problem is, the

25

rule—what's in the file, when you go through the file, it

looks like—we had that debate that we took out of the order
that it would be Judge Rigtrup would get it, and that could
be easily construed to make it look like that means you
wanted it.
And so we don't have a clear, definitive position
for the clerks to look at to say how we get it in front of
Judge Rigtrup.
THE COURT:

I think all you'd have to do

is suggest to the clerk that the Judge suggested maybe
Rigtrup ought to hear it and suggested you talk to him.
Have you tried to talk to him personally?
MR. ZOLL:

I—yes.

And he won't—he

won't talk ex parte to me, Judge.
THE COURT:
MR. ZOLL:

Well, the two of you then.
I'd be glad to walk over

there right now and ask the Judge or get him on the phone,
because both Counsel and I—this counsel, of course, we
asked him and he said that he wouldn't—at least my office
asked Mr. Rust, and he said no, that he wanted to have the
matter heard before this Court, and—
MR. RUST:
THE COURT:
MR. RUST:

I—
Just a second.
Your Honor, I have never had

that conversation with anyone from his office.
MR. ZOLL:

No.

I understand that my--

my—my receptionist said, just even today, that we—that
since we knew it was Judge Hyde that already had made this —
what we felt this recommendation was, that—and I think it
was Kathy that was on—involved on that, and she said both
counsel have to stipulate and all—and it was Kathy that
spoke with Mr. Rust today and he suggested that he would not
stipulate.
MR. RUST:

Your Honor, may I just speak

THE COURT:

Well, that was in response

to that?

to a call that you made to Kathy?
MR. ZOLL:
THE COURT:

Yes.
You called?

MR. ZOLL:

That's correct.

MR. RUST:

Your Honor, may I just speak

on this — this issue of Judges.

As the Court notes, we have

been before a number of different judges in this particular
case, and for the reasons that we're all aware of.

But I

might note that when we went before Judge Hanson, this was
Mr. Zoll's motion to continue the trial, and I was told that
that was going to be heard before Judge Hanson, and we went
there, and Judge Hanson sharply criticized us for assuming
to be able to, even by stipulation, go see him.
And—and very frankly, as I understand the system,
that—that it is up to the clerk of Judge Moffat's Court how
4

THE CLERK:

1
2

Well, he is there, but

apparently, he doesn't have anybody there right now.

3

THE COURT:

What does that mean?

4

THE CLERK:

That she's gone to talk to

5

him to see if (inaudible).

6
7

(Inaudible)
Judge Rigtrup?

8
9

14

Have you got him on the

THE CLERK:

I do, and I don't understand

the things here enough to — just do (inaudible)

12
13

THE COURT:
phone?

10
11

Judge Hyde, would you mind talking to

THE COURT:

Judge Rigtrup?

Fine, fine,

Grant.
I've got a case over here that I reinstated the

15

judgment on based on a hearing that was held in your Court

1G

on the motion.

IT

A motion has been raised to set aside my

18

reinstatement and part of the basis of it is what went on in

19

your hearing, I just went on a cold record.

20

I have suggested to Counsel that the motion to set

21

it aside should probably be heard by you, if you're willing

22

to hear it.

23

reinstatement of the default based on—yeah, which I did

24

based on your record, and the basis of it, basically would

25

be, I suppose, what went on in your Court at the time that

Oh, this is—it's a motion now to set aside the

AI A N P «;M»TW

r.sq

the order was granted.
I really didn't.

That's about right.

Now, he's

made a motion to set that aside, but the basis of the motion
now is basically on what went on in yours, not on what went
on in mine.
Yeah.

My—my ruling was based on my

interpretation of the record as to what you said, and it's —
Well, all right.
Yeah.

Let me take whatever I can.

You—do you actually have any recollection of it or —
Well, where you stand is basically about the only

way you're going to get before him is if I vacated my
ruling, just back the whole thing off and let him hear it,
and I don't particularly think that's warranted on the
record.
MR. ZOLL:

Then could I just make my

argument to your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I think we'd better

go forward with him.
Go ahead.
MR. ZOLL:

All right.

Let me first

state, I—I appreciate here being here, represent the
interest of Mr. Floyd Weston, who's seated here with us
today, Judge.

I

We have—we do have complete confidence that the
Court, when you see the facts and the whole procedure
15

outlined here, that your Honor will be able to see, I
believe, a couple of nuances that — that kind of make this
case, we think in fair play, lean in our favor.
As your Honor is well aware, this is a Rule 60(b)
motion.

60(b) is not one you always like to bring, because

that means you're in trouble, and in this particular case,
we know this makes your Honor a Court of equity.
And if I could refresh your memory, Judge, I know
you know it well; Rule 60(b) says that when we make the
motion upon terms that are just, the Court may, -in the
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment relating to mistake,
inadvertence, excusable neglect or Paragraph 7, any other
reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment.
There's no question that this Court is in—now
sits in a court of fairness, analyzing the facts and the
situation and the procedure that's happened, to make a
discretionary decision.

And it is discretionary.

I cite the case of United Factors vs. T.C.
Associates, 445 P.2d 766, that says it must be stressed that
it's within the discretion of the trial court to determine
whether the stipulation should be vacated.
And that's what we really have here, Judge, is a
stipulation, and that stipulation then embodies the areas of
contract law; offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual
16

1

wanted—

2

MR. RUST:

3

THE COURT:

All I'm saying—

4

MR. RDST:

—said—

5

THE COURT:

All I'm saying is that his

No, n o , a l l

I—

6

motion for the entry of judgment based on your failure to

7

comply with your agreement —

8

MR. RUST:

9

THE COURT:

Is denied then?
No.

No.

I'm backing off

10

the ruling I made on it, and you send that motion over to

11

Judge Rigtrup, where you are from day one.

12

MR. ZOLL:

All right.

13

MR. RUST:

May I have this much then for

14

our protection, your Honor?

15

letter of credit still remains to protect us against an

16

eventual judgment?

17

That the--that the $35,000

THE COURT:

If it—you--yeah, I'll make

18

that part of it; you agree to leave that in in case Judge

19

Rigtrup rules the same way.

20

You're going to have to face Judge Rigtrup—

21
22
23
24
25

Do you agree to that?

MR. WESTON:
wants.

If that's what Judge Hyde

I'd rather just leave 7,500 in, but —
THE COURT:

ruling on this 7,500.

No.

Well, I'm not making a

I'm going to let Rigtrup do it.

MR. WESTON:

Okay.

If that's what you
15_
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1

want,

then—

2

M R . ZOLL:
like to say that w e — w e

I think, your H o n o r ,

3

just

submit

4

you s u g g e s t e d ,

5

and the m o t i o n then will be opened up

that it's to n o t — t h a t

6

T H E COURT:

7

I am r e s c i n d i n g my

8

and refer

9

ruling

we rescind the

ruling

to—

The r e c o r d — f a r

the

on his motion to enter

T h e bond that you've issued,
stay

there in case it ends up that — i n

11

for the p r o t e c t i o n

12

going

13

but

14

the one that did it.

to flat

I think

of that party.

out — I

in all

record,

judgment

haven't

Thank you,

Judge.

17

guess M r . - - s h o u l d

the same

I think — I ' m

direction,
not

just

really changed my mind
ought

will

on it,

to go b a c k

to

I
MR.

16

that you h a v e ,

f a i r n e s s , it probably

15

We'll

ZOLL:

All

right.

That

is

fair.

leave the bond in p l a c e , w e ' l l , I

I do the order?

18

THE COURT:

19

him now is b a s i c a l l y

20

h e r e , that — o n

What you've got to a r g u e

the same m o t i o n that was brought

the entry of

to

in

judgment.

21

MR. RUST:

22

THE COURT:

23

M R . RUST:

24

THE COURT:
Here's

do it the way

that m o t i o n over to Rigtrup.

10

25

that we'll

we'd

Which will be my m o t i o n
W h i c h is your
All

now?

motion.

right.

I hope that disposes

of

it.

your—

15-

1

MR. ZOLL:

2

THE COURT:

3

sorry for all

4

do w i t h

Thank you, your H o n o r .
--to rectify it.

the c o n f u s i o n , but

I d o n f t know what

And

I'm

else to

it.

5

MR. ZOLL:

Just

for—for—for

moving

6

this m a t t e r along, n o r m a l l y , we would have to have some kind

7

of a m o t i o n to s u b — a

8

p e r m i s s i b l e to h a v e K a t h y a r r a n g e w i t h Judge Rigtrup's

9

to get

n o t i c e to submit

that on the c a l e n d a r as soon as

10

THE COURT:

11

and he said, in effect when

12

order

13

only way that it ought

14

following—

to avoid all

Certainly permissible with m e

to be done, and that's — I ' m

16

THE C O U R T :

And we'll

the

kind of

get it —

--frankly, kind of

following

suggestion.

18

MR.

19

standard way,

20

what's a g o o d — w h a t

21
22

possible?

the p r o c e d u r e p r o b l e m s , that's about

MR. ZOLL:

his

clerk

I was talking to him, if I — i n

15

17

and so forth; is it

ZOLL:

get it calendared

the

I don't h a v e my calendar with m e , to know
we can do, I m e a n ,
THE COURT:

long,

We'll

I have to —

W e l l , don't put this off

very

'cause—

23

MR. ZOLL:

24

Judge Bohling s t a r t i n g T u e s d a y

25

I've

got another w e e k - l o n g

______„

I won't.

I have a trial

with

that goes that week and

then

trial w i t h

Judge—
37

1

THE COURT:

Well, it isn't going to take

2

you long to--to get together and get yourself a hearing date

3

on it.

4

MR. ZOLL:

5

THE COURT:

6

calendar is or anything, but--

7

MR. ZOLL:

8

I don't know what his

Thank you, your Honor.

Appreciate it.

9
10

It won't.

THE COURT:
I

All right.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
21
* * *
31
41 GULL LABORATORIES, INC.,

CO

Plaintiff,

5

6

1

-vs-

Case No. 930900564

FLOYD E. WESTON, et al.,

BENCH DECISION, 2-27-95

7
Defendants.

8[
91
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day
11
of February, 1995, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause
12
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH
13
RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt
14
Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.
15
16
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17
For the Plaintiff

JOSEPH C. RUST
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant

B. RAY ZOLL
Attorney at Law

18
19
20
21
221
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by:
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RPR

23
24
25
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

versus Floyd E. Weston, et al., File 930900564,

4
5

Gull Laboratories, Inc.,

Plaintiff is represented by Joseph C.
Rust,

Defendants are represented by B. Ray Zoll.

6

The Court, after having heard argument,

7

observes that Plaintiff has filed a Motion for

8

Reinstatement of Summary Judgment.

9

Defendants haven't filed any motion for

10

relief from the effective stipulation under 60(d)

11

whatever or any other particular affirmative motion.

12

The Court probably ought not to lose

13

sight of the fact that it's judging people, not

14

lawyers.

15

your back for creating some of the problems.

16

you've persisted and urged your point so strongly

17

that finally Judge Hyde has backed off.

18
19
20
21
22

And I think, Mr. Zoll, the monkey is on
And

I will treat your responsive pleadings o
objection as a motion for a Rule 60(b) relief.
The Court will find excusable neglect on
the part of Mr. Weston.
I will grant relief from the -- there is

23

still an outstanding order signed by Judge Hyde

24

that's never been specifically withdrawn that he

25

signed and entered February 8th, 1995.

1

I will grant you conditional relief under

2

Rule 65(b) on the condition that by 5:00 p.m. on

3

March the -- March the 10th, 1995, you tender a cash

4

or its equivalent -- that's either cash or money

5

order or cashier's check or whatever —

6

ten-percent interest from October 3, 1995; plus

7

$1,500 attorney's fees; plus any cost incurred by

8

Plaintiffs in pursuing execution on the outstanding

9

judgment that was entered.

10

$7,500 plus

If those conditions are not met, the

11

Order entered by Judge Hyde on October 8th, 1995, is

12

to be reinstated.

13
14

Are there any questions?

Is there any

lack of clarity in the Court's ruling.

15

MR. RUST:

For clarification, Your Honor,

16

does the Court find any excusable neglect on the part

17

of Mr. Zoll?

18
19

THE COURT:

I'm not going to make a

finding on that.

20

MR. ZOLL:

For clarification, Your Honor,

21

would the ten-percent interest include the $1,500

22

from the --

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Ten-percent interest on the

$7,500 from October 3, 1995, until paid.
In addition to that, as a condition of

1

granting your relief, I am awarding $1,500 to

2

Mr, Rust for fees.

3

You've created a whole new volume since

4

you started arguing about this.

5

incurred in pursuing execution.

And any costs

6

MR. ZOLL:

I understand.

7

MR. RUST:

I might note for the Court,

8

Your Honor, that we have incurred more than $1,500 in

9

attorney's fees --

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RUST:

12

I understand.
-- from that date to the

present.

13

THE COURT:

If I could have gotten the

14

two of you to me instead of Judge Hyde and got you to

15

focus on that one narrow issue, we would have saved

16

fees for Mr. Weston, and the corporate client would

17

have saved fees for you, Mr. Rust.

18

And I haven't had an affidavit or

19

whatever, but I have reviewed Volume 2, completely

20

and gone back to the back part of Volume 1 so I think

21

I am generally focused on all that's gone on since.

22

And, unfortunately, I had even written

23

half of a 4501 Ruling responding to the notice to

24

submit.

25

updating paper work and find that Judge Hyde had

And then I go back downstairs and get the

1

already ruled.

So I tore up my good work and threw

2

it in the wastebasket.

3

So I have reviewed it very carefully.

4

MR, RUST:

Thank you,

5

MR- ZOLL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

The only real basis of my

7

ruling is that although the Court recognizes and

8

realizes the clients ought to be bound by the actions

9

of their attorney, I think you've created part of the

10

problem, Mr. Zoll.

And it was clear and unmistakable

11

in my mind.

12

you -- the notice was clear in my mind that there was

13

a settlement conference, but there was also a pending

14

motion.

15

But I did it from the bench.

16

to talk about settlement," and I had you going back

17

and forth between here and the telephone.

18

accept as true what Mr. Weston has said in his

19

Affidavit and afford him the benefit of excusable

20

neglect.

Part of the problem was that I pushed

And I said we are going to start talking.

21

MR. RUST:

22

an order, Your Honor?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RUST:

25

THE COURT:

I said:

"We are going

And I will

Would you like me to prepare

Will you prepare an order?
Yes.
We will be in recess.

1

MR. RUST:

Thank you, Your

2

MR. ZOLL:

Thank

3

41
5

6

1

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Honor.

you.

(Hearing

adjourned.)

1

REPORTER'S

CERTIFICATE

21
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

County of SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

5
6
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11
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